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US Military and Covert Action  
and Global Justice
Sagar Sanyal
AbstrAct: US military intervention and covert action is a significant con-
tributor to global injustice. Discussion of this contributor to global injustice 
is relatively common in social justice movements. Yet it has been ignored 
by the global justice literature in political philosophy. This paper aims to fill 
this gap by introducing the topic into the global justice debate. While the 
global justice debate has focused on inter-national and supra-national in-
stitutions, I argue that an adequate analysis of US military and covert action 
must focus on domestic institutions of the US. I describe many such institu-
tions including industry lobbying, the ubiquity of US military bases abroad, 
US programs for training foreign militaries, secrecy of the intelligence and 
military agencies, pliant news media and government propaganda.
US military intervention and covert action is a significant contributor to global injustice. Discussion of this contributor to global injustice is relatively common 
in social justice movements. Yet it has been ignored by the global justice literature 
in political philosophy. It is odd that while the global justice debate has tackled 
such issues as whether imperatives of progressive redistribution of wealth apply 
globally as they do domestically, it has remained silent on the much more glaring 
injustice of systematic aggression and intervention by a global superpower.
This paper aims to fill this gap by introducing the topic into the global justice 
debate. I describe the major institutional features contributing to the injustices. 
A program for addressing these injustices would focus on reforms to these insti-
tutions. I do not present such a program here, since adequate evaluation of the 
relative merits of competing reform proposals would require lengthy discussion. 
However, I hope that identifying the relevant institutions will provide impetus 
towards such a research program.
Section One places the project in the context of related existing literature. The 
project differs from the just war theory literature in part because of the discussion 
of covert action. Another novel feature of the project is the view that adequately 
addressing US military and covert action within the global justice debate requires 
focusing on domestic US institutions. This contrasts to the usual focus of global jus-
tice theory on inter-national and supra-national institutions. Section Two outlines 
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the domestic institutions that will be discussed in the rest of the paper, presenting 
them as relating to four guiding questions. Section Three discusses industries that 
may benefit from military and covert action. Section Four describes the means 
by which special interest groups with an interest in military or covert action can 
disproportionately affect the relevant government policy-makers. Section Five 
mentions some institutional features that increase the likelihood of a significant 
component of military or covert action in US foreign policy. Section Six notes 
institutions that reduce the ability of a relatively peaceful public to counter the 
influence of the relevant special interests. Section Seven concludes.
SeCtion one: DiStinGUiShinG My proJeCt froM  
relAteD exiStinG literAtUre
Just War theory
An obvious connection to recent philosophical discussion of war would be the 
just war and humanitarian intervention debates. The just war and humanitarian 
intervention approaches morally assess a given war or military action—such as 
the recent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq—to determine whether its launch 
and its conduct are justified. I do not engage these debates here.1
US policy since the end of WW2 has been militarily aggressive and has in-
tervened in the (often democratic) politics of sovereign states either covertly or 
overtly in countries across the world. This has been a consistent feature of US 
foreign policy across administrations and across the Republican/Democratic di-
vide. I do not argue this historical point, as it would require empirical assessment 
of intervention after intervention. Rather I only footnote some texts where such 
cases have already been argued.2 While the just war debate would treat as its end 
point the determination of whether a given case of military intervention is just 
or unjust, this paper opens a new debate that takes this as a starting point. The 
starting point is the role of the US government as the source of a large amount of 
military aggression and political intervention for many decades.
Covert Action
Moreover, while the just war debate focuses on formal large-scale war, I focus in 
addition on certain sorts of covert interventions abroad. Covert action is activ-
ity that is meant to further the sponsoring nation’s (in our case the US’s) foreign 
policy objectives and that is to be concealed to allow the nation to plausibly deny 
responsibility.3
Such covert interventions can include funding, training and otherwise sup-
porting armed groups (whether governmental or non-governmental), as well as 
violent actions by US employees themselves.4 Intelligence agencies such as the 
CIA are not involved merely in intelligence gathering and espionage. From the 
outset (the late 1940s), they have also been involved in covert operations involv-
ing economic and paramilitary warfare.5 This sort of covert activity is as much a 
concern for global justice as overt, large-scale warfare.
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The overt military and covert political intervention is often unjust and also 
leads to unjust consequences. Common consequences of modern warfare include 
death, impairment, disease, destruction of key infrastructure (such as roads, 
bridges, factories, hospitals, government organizational capacity), destruction 
of resources (such as arable land, reservoirs of clean drinking water), instability 
that makes the region less attractive as a site of productive investment.
In cases of covert political intervention that deposed a government unattract-
ive to the US government and installed another more attractive to it, there can 
be distributional consequences depending on whether the deposed government 
was likely to better serve the interests of the domestic poor and the new govern-
ment was more likely to side with existing elites. These consequences thus con-
tribute to human suffering directly, as well as indirectly by reducing the chances 
of a pro-poor government in the victim country. US government support for a 
brutal regime through training of troops and arms sales can enable the regime 
to internally repress dissidence. An interference in the right to collective self-
determination or democracy of the inhabitants of the country whose government 
is the object of interference is also a form of injustice, quite aside from any other 
harm inflicted in the coup process or as a consequence of the new government 
being worse for the people.
the proper institutional objects of Global Justice Debate
It is commonly agreed that the subject of the global justice debate is the set of 
background institutions that constitute the context within which global agents act. 
Supposing the starting point of unjust US military intervention, one way to pro-
ceed in a global justice debate would be to consider the international background 
institutions that allow a country to militarily aggress and to politically intervene 
in foreign lands. I argue that an adequate political philosophical discussion of 
unjust US military and political intervention must do more than this. I argue that 
it must also consider various domestic institutions of the US.
Consider three relevant nodes of the global injustice before us. One node is 
US government foreign policy-making. Let us refer to this as node Y. A second 
node is the group of persons in a foreign land treated unjustly by the particular 
policy that issues from node Y. Call this group Z. Now, US government foreign 
policy-making is not an agent or a collection of agents. It is merely an institution 
in which agents interact to form particular policies. So there is a third node, call 
it group X, of agents who have the determining influence over the foreign policy-
making institution in order to issue a particular instance of aggressive policy. A 
group X uses an instrument Y (that is the policy of its government) for its gain. 
As a by-product, this harms a group Z.
Both groups X and Z are part of the global community. One approach to 
this problem would be to look for the background institutions common to both 
groups that underlie their interactions. In global politics, it is unclear whether 
such institutions exist. At the very least, if there are such common institutions, 
they are not as well developed as national institutions of democracy. More to the 
point for our case, however, the institution used by group X relates to a national 
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government (node Y). This institution is not common to group Z. Nor is it clear 
whether group Z should have a formal voice in the foreign policy of a foreign 
country (that is, in node Y).
Perhaps the focus should be on designing international institutions common 
to both groups X and Z, that can mediate the actions of national governments 
with the interests of those foreign agents (such as group Z) who bear the brunt 
of the action. So for example, an international criminal court or a reformed UN 
might be vested with powers to intervene against national governments. This is a 
promising path for international politics in general. However, this is not the path I 
consider. This is for two reasons. One, there is a considerable body of research on 
this topic already in the philosophical literature, while there is another relevant 
path (one that occupies the rest of this paper) in which there is very little.
Two, this path is not particularly relevant to the aggression of the US in par-
ticular, even if it may be relevant to the aggression of other governments. The US 
has veto power in the UN Security Council, leaving the UN with no practical way 
of sanctioning or criticising them. In any case, while sanctions may be significant 
deterrents to smaller and less powerful countries, they are not deterrents to a 
country as powerful as the US. The US is assured of continued good economic 
relations with all trade partners of consequence because it is such a large market 
for exports. It is also assured against military aggression because it has by far the 
most powerful military in the world. Neither the threat of economic sanction nor 
that of military sanction is credible to decision makers in the US government.
As for an international criminal court, again the matter is one of enforcement 
against a collective agent as powerful as the US. The International Court of Jus-
tice in 1986 found in favour of Nicaragua against the US on the counts (among 
others) that the US had breached customary international law by intervening 
in the affairs of another state, by violating its sovereignty and by using force 
against it. It also found that by producing and disseminating to the Contras (a 
guerrilla organization seeking to overthrow the democratic government of Ni-
caragua) a manual called Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare, the US 
had encouraged the commission by them of acts contrary to general principles 
of humanitarian law. The Court found that the US was obliged to desist in its 
activities and to make reparations.6 The reparations were never enforced and US 
covert intervention abroad has continued. A recent example of ‘off the books’ 
covert action is the attempt to influence the Iraqi election in 2005. The attempt 
used retired CIA officers and other non-government personnel, as well as funds 
that were not necessarily appropriated by Congress in order to avoid having to 
inform Congress.7
If the global justice debate on military aggression limits itself to considering 
only the option of liberal states intervening to counter the aggression of an outlaw 
state (as in Rawls’s Law of Peoples), then this leaves us no means of addressing 
the aggression of the very powerful states, including the US. The US is argu-
ably not a liberal state by Rawls’s definition of the term. Among the criteria for 
being a liberal people, is that its government be under popular control and not 
driven by a large concentration of private economic power. The US fails on this 
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count due to its political system being driven by large concentrations of private 
economic power. The US arguably also fails to count as a decent state under 
Rawls’s definition. Under the criteria for a decent people is that it does not have 
not have aggressive foreign policies. Again, the US fails on this count.8 Rawls 
writes of outlaw states that threaten peace by attempting to expand their power 
and influence. He suggests that the law of peoples allows peoples to fight these 
outlaw states in self-defence. While this may be a practicable way to deal with 
militarily and economically weak states, it is not practicable in countering the US. 
Coercive and military action is ruled out as an avenue to addressing this injustice 
for this reason alone, quite without considering other important reasons such as 
the likely consequence of war that innocents will be harmed. By only considering 
the option of liberal states intervening to counter the aggression of a fellow state, 
we—in effect, if not by intent—cement the place of the existing domination of the 
world by a superpower and its allies.
Domestic institutions of the US as a proper object of Global Justice
The contrasting approach I pursue notes that institutional contributors to injustice 
may lie not only in the international background institutions common to both 
groups X and Z, but also in the institutions that allow group X to influence the 
policy making of process Y. The guiding theme of this paper is that there are sys-
tematic reasons for the aggressive foreign policy of the US and that if anything 
is to be changed, it is by addressing these systematic biases through institutional 
reform. Given that the relevant institutions concern decision-making in Y, they 
are domestic institutions.
An initial reticence about this project may spring from a view of liberal 
tolerance applied improperly. If the policy of a government was simply a repre-
sentation of the interests and views of ‘the citizenry,’ ‘the nation’ or ‘the people’ 
in some aggregate way, then the tolerant and liberal path might be to treat the 
policy stance of the government as a brute fact as far as global justice debates are 
concerned. It might be thought illiberal or intolerant to seek reforms to domestic 
institutions in the expectation of changing the government policy. This would 
leave us simply with the problem of designing supra-national or inter-national 
institutions of governance and policy-making that are more democratic and that 
try to mitigate the effects of unequal power.
In a sense, this would treat the governments as global analogues of individu-
als in the domestic arena. It would treat fair, democratic and constitutionally 
bound inter-national institutions as the global analogue of fair, democratic and 
constitutionally bound mechanisms for inter-individual relations in the domestic 
arena. It is a liberal tenet to not interfere in the choices of an individual unless 
absolutely necessary and to only change the background institutions that deter-
mine relations between individuals. Similarly, the global justice literature appears 
to have supposed that global political philosophy should treat as out-of-bounds 
any discussion of the policy-making mechanisms of governments (at least of 
representative democracies) and should only seek to change institutions that 
determine relations between sovereign states.
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However, the idea of liberal tolerance is here applied improperly precisely 
because government policy is not a simple representation of its constituents. It is 
a representation of the special interest groups or elites that have captured it. It is 
conceivable that the government might somehow unproblematically represent 
the aggregate interests of its constituents or the view of ‘the people.’ However, 
this conceivability is irrelevant to political reality. Often in reality, and certainly 
in the cases of the powerful countries of the world today, important government 
policies disproportionately serve the interests of special interest groups. There 
are institutions that allow special interest groups to capture policy-making and 
that shield this from the eyes of the rest of the voting public. Analysis of special 
interest groups is a staple of political theory, sociology and public sector econom-
ics. Political philosophers, however, have failed to adequately emphasise this in 
global justice debates.  
Accordingly, if agents are unhappy with the policy preferences of a foreign 
government, they need not treat the policy-formation process as inviolable, and 
need not restrict themselves to advocating only changes to inter-national or 
supra-national institutions. They can, in addition, agitate for changes to certain 
domestic institutions of the foreign country. Even though the demand is for do-
mestic institutional reform in the US, it is a demand properly made by citizens 
of any country in the world in the interests of global justice. For, people in many 
countries in the world are affected, or reasonably fear being affected, by relevant 
US foreign policy. This is a feature of the amount of power at the disposal of the 
US government. The enormous power at the disposal of the US government has 
enabled it to become a significant contributor to global injustice. Accordingly, it 
is rightly a locus for investigation in the global justice debate.
Note that while advocacy by foreigners of domestic institutional change is 
legitimate in this case, this does not imply that intervention by foreigners in those 
domestic institutions would be justified. I am concerned with a discussion of 
reforms in US domestic institutions that would reduce global injustice. I am not 
concerned with a discussion of the ways in which foreign powers may legitimately 
seek to influence US domestic institutions. The practical relevance of the discussion 
in this paper lies in the fact that, at the very least, US citizens concerned about 
global injustice may legitimately seek to reform their domestic institutions.
There remains a final point to make in relating this paper to the existing global 
justice literature. There has been increasing discussion of certain international 
financial institutions in political philosophy and this has created scope for a focus 
on the special interest groups that maintain and perpetuate culpable aspects of the 
institutions. For example, in the case of the sovereign debt debate,9 it is possible 
to note the special part being played by the negotiators from some countries and 
to note that those negotiators are captured by special interests within the country, 
such as commercial and investment banks. Or again, in the case of the World Trade 
Organization, it is widely acknowledged that US and EU protectionism of their 
agricultural industries hinders the ability of developing countries to raise their 
national incomes through agricultural exports. It is noted that this is substantially 
due to lobbying from the domestic agricultural industry in the US and EU.
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Nonetheless, not much has been made of the roles of these special interest 
groups in the global justice debate in political philosophy and prescriptions of 
institutional reform have focused on the international financial institutions only 
and not on domestic institutions that enable the special interest groups to capture 
their government’s policy making. In advocating domestic institutional reform 
on certain issues of global justice, I consider myself to be developing this aspect 
of the recent literature.
SeCtion tWo: the inStitUtionS to be DiSCUSSeD
Underlying my criticisms of various US domestic institutions, is what I take to be 
an uncontroversial precautionary principle. A military or an intelligence agency 
embodies a concentration of power. At times, concentrations of power and their 
deployment may be necessary. However, a cautionary acknowledgement is that 
there is a potential for concentrations of power being used for unjust purposes. 
The uncontroversial precautionary principle is to bind concentrations of power 
with various checks and balances to minimize the possibility of their being used 
for unjust purposes.10
With respect to the US military and intelligence agencies, such checks and 
balances include strong democratic accountability. Any policy regarding use of 
the military should be vetted by an informed public. Another check is to neutra-
lise as far as possible any systematic pressures to deploy the military. The public 
(or elected representatives) may still determine that military or covert action 
is appropriate in a given case. However, the absence of systematic pressures 
to act thus would ensure that this power is only deployed when determined to 
be necessary.
I discuss various domestic US institutions that either reduce democratic ac-
countability of the military and intelligence agencies or that create systematic 
pressures for their use. I group my discussion of relevant institutions as answers 
to four questions. I state these questions and briefly foreshadow the answers 
before launching into the discussion proper.
1. What sorts of groups x are likely to benefit most from military 
intervention by the US government?
Systematic pressures to deploy the military are likely to emerge from the defence 
industry (which supplies the government with weapons and various services in the 
event of military action) and from large industries (especially extractive industries) 
that might benefit from using covert or overt military action that secures access 
to natural resources or to markets in foreign lands. With respect to pressure from 
the defence industry, this idea of the military-industrial complex has occupied 
popular discourse at least since former US President Dwight Eisenhower’s 1961 
farewell speech upon leaving office. With respect to pressure from extractive 
industries, this idea has been discussed popularly in the context of colonialism 
and empire. Both systematic pressures, however, have been ignored in political 
philosophy, whether in discussions of war or of global justice.
220 Sagar SaNyal
2. through which institutions are these interests able to have 
disproportionate influence on foreign policy?
This is a matter of the means by which the identified group X can influence the 
relevant foreign policy makers in the US government (Y). As with any special 
interests, these ones are likely to seek to influence policy through lobbying and 
campaign finance. This influence can target both the executive branch (through 
political parties) and Congress. A ‘revolving door’ between highly placed officers 
in these companies and highly placed officers in the executive branch of govern-
ment also raises concerns about conflict of interest improprieties. An additional 
influence of defence companies on congresspersons is through the threat of re-
moving skilled defence jobs from the congressional district. The degree of influ-
ence afforded by such mechanisms is disproportionate to the number of voters 
benefiting from the decision. The majority of voters may have little to gain from 
the policy, and may even be against military intervention. However, organised, 
wealthy and well-connected special interests have greater influence on policy 
makers through lobbying and campaign contributions than do unorganised, 
relatively poor and relatively poorly connected voters.
3. Are there any institutional features that increase the likelihood 
of a significant component of military and covert intervention in US 
foreign policy?
There are three institutional factors to discuss—the proliferation of US military 
bases abroad, US training of foreign militaries and pressure from the defense 
industry.
The US maintains a large number of military bases around the world. This 
makes it faster and cheaper to deploy troops whether for small-scale covert 
operations, or, if the bases are large, also for larger and overt interventions. In 
addition there are the pressures from defence industry lobbies who would stand 
to gain contracts from any intervention. If a given problem can be addressed both 
through military/covert intervention and through other means, these institutions 
serve to systematically make the former means more attractive for the decision 
makers in Y.
The US institution of training foreign militaries creates a channel of support 
for the relevant militaries through arms and intelligence. Such support can be 
a harmful sort of intervention in itself if the foreign military is repressive of the 
domestic population. The institution of training sometimes also allows the US to 
influence a foreign military to carry out US foreign policy by proxy, bypassing 
any domestic US compunction about the intervention.
4. Are there any institutions that reduce the ability of a relatively 
peaceful public majority to counter the influence of the relevant 
special interests?
I discuss three institutions here—lack of democratic accountability; the poor 
performance of the mass media; and government propaganda.
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Some of the military and covert interventions occur with little oversight by 
Congress. In such cases, there is not even a formal democratic check on the policy 
through congressional representatives. The intelligence agencies, for example, 
conduct projects that are not properly identified on the budgets approved by 
Congress. Historically, projects by US intelligence agencies have included not 
merely spying, but also political intervention in other countries, arms exports, 
supporting of coups and political assassinations.
The poor performance of the mass media means that when a decision to 
militarily intervene is publicly aired, much of the voting public does not receive 
a balanced account of the issue. Academic analysis of the US mass media system 
notes various factors that contribute to the poor performance.
A factor that relates closely to mass media, but that nonetheless deserves in-
dependent mention is that of Defense Dept PSYOPS (psychological operations) 
programs. Even when these are theoretically aimed at an international audience 
rather than the domestic one, the nature of global news coverage in mass media 
is such that the psyops influence domestic audiences as well.
US voters other than the identified group X formally have the capacity to influence 
Y and to temper the influence of their fellow constituents in group X. However, these 
are institutional reasons that reduce the likelihood and efficacy of the tempering.
recap of the institutions
Note the various institutions mentioned: lobbying and campaign finance pres-
sure from defence industry and from other industries on policy makers; ‘re-
volving door’ appointments in the relevant industries and the relevant policy 
offices; the threat of reducing jobs in a congressional district; the maintenance 
of a proliferation of US military bases abroad; the secrecy of various intelligence 
and military activities of agencies in the US and the lack of oversight by congress; 
the poor performance of mass media; and the propaganda (or psychological 
operations) of the Defense Dept. These institutions operate in various ways, 
as distinguished by the various subheadings above. Some of the institutions 
create a pressure on foreign-policy makers to intervene politically or militar-
ily, others make certain types of intervention more attractive in comparison to 
alternative ways to address a given problem. Some institutions make it easier 
for the identified special interest groups to shape policy without the critical 
attention of either Congress or of a significant proportion of the voting popula-
tion. I describe these institutions below in four sections corresponding to the 
four questions above.
SeCtion three: the intereStS of CertAin inDUStrieS  
in MilitAry AnD politiCAl intervention by  
the US GovernMent in foreiGn lAnDS
Defense industry
Traditional defense companies make the goods of war, such as weapons, ammuni-
tion, aircraft, tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery. They also provide technical 
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services to maintain these weapons and services such as logistics, training and 
communications support. The major US companies in this industry include Lock-
heed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, and Raytheon. 
These five are also among the six largest defense companies worldwide (the other 
being the UK company BAE Systems).
More recently, private intelligence-gathering companies have been contracted 
by government intelligence gathering agencies. Major such companies include 
Science Applications International Corporation, Booz Allen Hamilton and CACI 
International. The services of CACI include the provision of interrogators, four of 
whom have been accused of being directly or indirectly responsible for torturing 
prisoners in Abu Ghraib.11
Private Military Contractors or PMCs offer personnel (as opposed to equip-
ment) for combat zones. Their services include armed combat services, retired 
officers to provide strategic advice and military training; logistics; intelligence; 
maintenance services to armed forces; and tactical combat operations. Camp Doha 
in Kuwait, which served as the launch pad for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, was not 
only built by a PMC but also operated and guarded by one. Significant use of 
PMCs began in the early 1990s and has boomed in the twenty-first century.12
There are problems peculiar to the growing PMCs and to the intelligence 
gathering companies that are not shared by other aspects of the defense industry. 
For instance, while US military personnel are accountable to a system of laws 
defining acceptable conduct and to an institution for enforcing these laws, private 
contractors hired by the Pentagon may not be. While US intelligence agencies may 
be legally bound by laws circumscribing permissible spying and may be subject 
to established oversight institutions to enforce these laws, contracted intelligence 
gatherers may not be so easily bound by enforceable law and their activities may 
remain hidden from any oversight under the guise of a business secret.
These companies have significant interests tied to US foreign policy. Here are 
the revenues from defense activities for 2007 for some of the larger companies. Lock-
heed Martin received US$ 38.5 billion; Boeing received US$ 32 billion; Northrop 
Grumman US$ 24 billion; Raytheon US$ 19.8 billion. Of the intelligence gather-
ing companies, SAIC received US$ 6.5 billion and Booz Allen Hamilton received 
almost US$ 3 billion.13
These companies have significant business deals with the US Departments of 
Defense and of State, and various US intelligence agencies. Insofar as covert or 
overt military or political intervention abroad by US government agencies require 
the products and services of the arms, intelligence-gathering and private contrac-
tor companies, the companies have an interest in the US government pursuing 
such foreign policies.
There are also ways for the defense industry to profit from US foreign policy 
other than by directly selling their products to the US military establishment. 
The companies can sell their products to the governments of other countries. 
An aspect of US foreign policy is its training of foreign militaries. The US State 
Department’s International Military Education and Training program offered 
military training to 133 countries in 2002 (for comparison, there are 189 member 
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countries in the UN). Such close contact between US military instructors and for-
eign officers and familiarity (during training) with US-made weapons translates 
into an inside track in weapons sales to these foreign governments. The seller of 
weapons in these transactions might be the Defense Dept or private companies 
licensed to sell weapons by the State Dept. This is a lucrative trade. The US is the 
biggest seller of munitions worldwide and exported US$ 44.82 billion in arms 
over the period 1997–2001.14
non-defense industries
Various industries (often extractive industries) would like access to the natural 
resources of foreign countries. Cost minimising motives predispose such com-
panies to use means at their disposal to ensure the cheapest possible access to 
these resources. A foreign political aspirant’s declared intention to nationalise, 
say, the country’s oil industry or to raise the royalties demanded for resources, 
would encroach on the cost minimising motive of the company. If the company 
C from the US competes against a company from foreign country F over access 
to natural resources in a third country T, C might win the access to the resources 
if the political regime in T is friendlier to the government of the US than to the 
government of F. These sorts of considerations create an interest in influencing 
the US government to pursue a certain type of foreign policy, to bring about a 
certain sort of regime in a foreign country. Let me mention two of the better known 
examples of such intervention.
The US and British backed coup deposing Prime Minister Mosaddeq of Iran 
in 1953 and US support of the ensuing dictatorship of the brutal Shah is an ex-
ample of covert US action tied up with oil interests. Mosaddeq had nationalised 
the country’s oil industry which at the time had a significant role for British oil 
interests.
The United Fruit Company successfully pressured the Eisenhower government 
to topple democratically elected President Arbenz of Guatemala via the CIA in 
1954. Arbenz’s agrarian reform agenda was set to hurt the Company’s interests 
which included large landholdings in the country.
SeCtion foUr: WhAt Are the inStitUtionS AlloWinG 
the relevAnt intereStS to exerCiSe DiSproportionAte 
inflUenCe on the foreiGn poliCy MAkinG?
lobbying, Campaign Contributions, political engineering  
and front-loading
A six year study (1998–2003) of Department of Defense contracts, finds that the 
ten largest defense contractors all spent heavily on both campaign contributions 
(a combined $35.7 million) and lobbying ($414.6 million). The return on their 
investment was a combined $340 billion in contracts over that time.15 Other major 
lobbying industries include the energy industry. Campaign contributions and 
lobbying are aimed both at congresspersons and at the executive. To influence the 
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executive branch, attention might be lavished on senior members of the relevant 
political parties, and on the presidential candidates.
Former Defense Dept military analyst Franklin Spinney describes the two 
techniques of front-loading and political engineering used by defense companies. 
Political engineering involves defense contractors spreading jobs and profits over 
as many congressional districts as possible. Complex weapons systems often 
involve sub-systems that are sub-contracted to other firms. Such sub-contracting 
increases the ability to spread production across congressional districts. This 
maximises the number of congresspersons who stand to lose jobs and revenue 
for their district’s economy (and potentially stand to lose votes as a consequence) 
in case the defense contract is cancelled. Such pork barrel politics also allows 
congresspersons to ingratiate themselves with constituents by ‘winning’ defense 
contracts for their district.
Those approving a defense program may have qualms about its cost. Front 
loading is the idea of attaining this approval by quoting unrealistically low fig-
ures in order to get the seed money for the program. Once the program is begun, 
it is easier to get approval for the actual, higher, costs, since failure to approve 
the costs would leave nothing to show for the seed investment. The approval 
is also made easier by political engineering, as many congresspersons stand to 
lose jobs and revenue in their district. By low-balling the cost, the contract is 
made easier to approve. By political engineering, the contract is made difficult 
to terminate.
Individuals in the Pentagon or Department of Defense are happy with the setup 
as they get control over a growing volume of resources and weapons. Individuals 
in the Congress are happy because this funnels government money (via Depart-
ment of Defense and via defense contractors) to their districts. The contractors 
are happy as they ensure greater demand for their products.16
revolving Door
An example of the institution of a revolving door is in private equity firms. A 
growing number of private equity firms are investing in defense companies in 
order to win contracts from the Department of Defense and the newly created 
Department of Homeland Security. This growth is understandable given the 
size of the potential pool available to contractors in this area. Half of the Defense 
Department budget (approximately $900 billion between 1998 and 2003) has 
gone to contractors rather than paying for direct costs such as payrolls for the 
uniformed armed services.17 A 2004 report on private equity firms investing in 
defense companies revealed that such equity firms employ five of the past nine 
defense secretaries, two secretaries of state, two national security chiefs, two CIA 
directors and dozens of distinguished retired military officials.18 For a discussion 
of the Carlyle Group, the private equity firm with some of the greatest revenue 
from defense contracts in recent years, see.19
Here is an example of a revolving door between the Defense Dept and the 
defense industry. In 1992, Dick Cheney, held the office of Secretary of Defense. In 
that year, the Defense Dept paid the company Brown & Root a total of $8.9 million 
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to produce a classified report detailing how private companies could help provide 
logistics for American troops. In the same year, that company won a contract to 
provide logistics for American troops. Between 1992 and 1999 the Defense Dept 
paid Brown & Root over $1.2 billion for its work.
Cheney left the office of Secretary of Defense in 1992 and between 1995 and 
2000 he was CEO of Halliburton (of which Brown & Root was as subsidiary). 
When Cheney began his tenure at Halliburton, the latter was doing less than 
$300 million a year in business with the Defense Dept. By 1999, this figure had 
grown to over $650 million.20
The obvious worry is that the these ex-officials will be able to gain influence 
with their former colleagues in government and gain a competitive edge for 
their defense companies over competitor companies. Another worry is that if 
government officials are promised lucrative careers in a company after retire-
ment from office, they may be willing to pull strings to favour that company in 
the awarding contracts.
SeCtion five: inStitUtionAl feAtUreS thAt inCreASe  
the likelihooD of A SiGnifiCAnt CoMponent of MilitAry 
AnD politiCAl intervention in US foreiGn poliCy
There are three institutional factors to discuss—the proliferation of US military 
bases abroad, pressure from the defense industry and the US program of training 
foreign militaries.
The Defense Dept reports that in September 2001, there were 725 US mili-
tary installations on foreign soil.21 These are the officially disclosed numbers. In 
addition, there exist bases that are undisclosed or secret, either because public 
knowledge that an installation is American would be politically embarrassing for 
the host government or for other reasons.22
The presence of overseas bases in geo-politically strategic regions of the world 
potentially reduces the cost of at least small scale interventions abroad as person-
nel and equipment may not need to be moved from the US to the target region. 
The bases also provide personnel with an official reason for their presence in a 
region. This official reason can be the cover for covert operations. Thus, once 
a decision is made to militarily or politically interfere in a foreign country, the 
large number of bases stationed overseas may reduce the cost of an intervention 
or make a covert intervention easier to disguise.
Pressure from defense industry lobbies to prefer an interventionist alternative 
to a more diplomatic one may make itself felt informally through the close ties 
between the governmental defense establishment and the industry.
The US relies increasingly on its armed forces and intelligence agencies 
to deal with foreign policy issues at the expense of diplomatic resources. The 
general strategy has been to build close ties between the US military and the 
local military in a given region and thus open a channel of influence. Programs 
of military training and education, security assistance and foreign military 
sales have formed a part of this strategy. A distinct feature of this approach (as 
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compared to official diplomatic relations) is that Defense Dept related agencies 
are better able to operate covertly and to engage with unstable foreign powers 
without public scrutiny.
Within the US military, Unified Combatant Commands (UCCs) are joint mili-
tary commands composed of forces from more than one service (such as the army 
and the air force). There are six UCCs in charge of six broad regions of the world, 
carving up all inhabited continents. The commanders in charge of each region, 
called combatant commanders, are four star generals or admirals and report 
only to the Secretary of Defense and the President. They oversee such matters 
as arms sales, military bases, intelligence and special operations among others. 
These commanders have considerable impact on foreign policy in their region 
and often have more impact than US ambassadors operating in the region. One 
major type of influence is in the cultivation of close relations with local military 
organizations, often in the form of training missions by US Special Forces of the 
local military. These close relations serve as a conduit for arms sales, allow the 
possibility of US spying, and act as a channel of influence upon the local armies 
to carry out policies favored by the US Defence Dept.23
The growing influence of the Defense Dept in foreign policy, exhibited for 
instance in the significant powers available to the regional UCCs, makes it more 
likely that at least a part of the US foreign policy position in relation to a country 
will be in the form of military intervention. At times this will be because of explicit 
policy decisions in the US executive branch to deal with a perceived crisis not 
by diplomacy but instead by intervention in the form of arming of local military 
and paramilitary forces or influencing local militaries to enact US foreign policy 
by proxies or by other covert operations.
However, even in the ordinary course of events and in the absence of any 
perceived crisis, arms sales and US training of foreign militaries can be a poten-
tially harmful form of US military and political intervention abroad. For example, 
such training may support (in effect, if not by intent) the military of a repressive 
government against the wishes of the repressed population by supplying it with 
arms, training and techniques to keep rebellious populations under control.24 
The interest of the combatant commanders or of the Defense Dept in maintaining 
cooperative relations with the local military may trump any concern about the 
human rights record of the local military or the level of domestic popular support 
for the government even if the latter sorts of concerns have been raised by the 
State Dept or by Congress.25 For some indication of the breadth of such influence, 
note that US special operations forces alone (leaving aside regular military forces) 
train foreign troops in around 150 countries annually.26
Here is an example. In 1991, Indonesian troops trained by the US and supplied 
by US weapons massacred hundreds in East Timor. This led Congress to cut all 
funding for Indonesia under the International Military Education and Training 
Program (IMET). However, the Defense Dept secretly continued its military rela-
tions with Indonesia by initiating a new program—the Joint Combined Exchange 
Training program (JCET).The program purported to give US Special Forces train-
ing in foreign languages and familiarity with the local military, but in fact allowed 
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36 training exercises with the Indonesian special forces between 1992 and 1998.27 
The US Special Forces trained their counterparts in urban guerrilla warfare, sur-
veillance, sniper marksmanship and psychological operations.28
SeCtion Six: SeCreCy AnD lACk of  
inforMeD pUbliC overSiGht
Secrecy
Special Access Programs or SAPs are highly classified programs funded in a 
way to keep the budget secret. The budgets for such programs can be acquired 
through fake labels for projects or by channelling funds from other government 
agencies to the Defense Dept and the intelligence agencies. The Defense Dept 
began this practice with the Manhattan Project during WWII, which allowed the 
atomic bomb to be built without Congressional knowledge.
Such Special Access Programs (also known as black projects covered under a 
black budget) are extensively used and can be well funded. For some indication, 
in 1992, a Library of Congress report noted that the GAO (Government Account-
ability Office) had identified 185 such programs and that recent estimates (since 
authoritative indicators are unavailable) suggest secret military spending of $30 
to $35 billion per year.29 Since then, the black budget is thought to have expanded. 
In 2003, it was reported to be at its highest since 1988.30 Much of the program 
involves research and development of expensive technology and weapons such 
as aircraft. However, the black budget also includes the budget for covert action 
by the many intelligence agencies.
Given the aim of plausible deniability for covert action, it is often difficult to 
establish where the authorization for a specific covert action was initiated.31
Since the Watergate scandal, there has been a requirement that CIA covert 
activity (if not covert activity carried out by other intelligence services) be autho-
rised by a Presidential finding. Moreover, a selected group of Congresspersons 
receive briefings on the Special Access Programs—the Senate and House Select 
Committees on Intelligence. However, even this reporting requirement may be 
waived at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense.32
These provisions have not worked as intended. Congress forbade CIA fund-
ing of the Contras—an armed guerrilla group seeking to overthrow the elected 
government of Nicaragua. The CIA got around the problem of inadequate funding 
for their support of the Contras by diverting funds raised through arms sales to 
Iran and by turning a blind eye as traffickers smuggled cocaine into the US and 
diverted some money to the Contras.33
Moreover, in the absence of Presidential findings on a specific issue, the CIA 
has used ‘worldwide findings’ as authority to initiate certain types of covert 
action. Covert operations can also be funded by seeking funds from corpora-
tions or foreign governments either as political favours or when some interests 
of these agents coincide with relevant interests of the decision-makers in the 
US government.34
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The 2005 US covert intervention in the Iraqi elections used retired CIA agents 
and other non-governmental personnel and funds not necessarily appropriated by 
Congress in the belief that it is only necessary to brief congressional intelligence 
committees if the CIA operation is an officially sanctioned one (Hersh 2005).
Mass Media
At times, a decision to intervene abroad is debated publicly before the interven-
tion. One possible check on a representative government’s power to intervene is 
the action of a majority of the population exercising their democratic power over 
governmental policy. The majority public opinion about the justice of, or need 
for, a proposed intervention depends partly on the factual information available 
to the public, and on its consequent ability to assess the reasons advanced for 
the intervention by the executive branch of the government. The institution with 
primary responsibility and capacity for the dissemination of such factual infor-
mation is the domestic mass media.
In cases where the government view has been captured by special interests who 
seek intervention, it is to be hoped that the news media would thoroughly assess 
the proposal to intervene to present the public with the requisite information to 
judge the cogency of the case for intervention. However, institutional analysis of 
US mass media suggests reasons that the news media’s discussion of a proposed 
intervention may tend to be insufficiently critical of government pronouncements. 
Let me outline some of the relevant analysis.
In the US mass media system, the dominant news organizations operate as 
profit maximizers and thus seek to minimize cost. They earn an income largely 
from advertising and have costs that include paying reporters and journalists 
and paying for independent investigations. Profit maximization places certain 
sorts of pressures.
It is costly to maintain a large staff of reporters to assign to stories as they arise, 
and it is costly to ask them to research each story, interview relevant sources, and 
seek out dissenting opinions. Wealthy and well organised groups can afford to 
make press releases, publications, briefings, and video and audio news releases 
about issues that affect their interests. Such groups can disseminate the press 
releases free of charge to news media. The cost minimising imperative of news 
organisations means that they will tend to have a bias towards accepting and 
presenting such cheap sources of news, and if at all possible, avoid incurring the 
cost of researching the issue themselves.
The groups with the requisite wealth for making such free press releases are, 
overwhelmingly, the corporate sector and the government. Thus, simply by the 
cost minimising imperative, news media have a tendency to over-represent the 
views of the corporate sector and the government. The corporate sector has long 
pursued a strategy for influencing media coverage of corporate issues by funding 
think tanks that can act as a nominally independent (not explicitly representing a 
corporation) source for interviewees. A very substantial US government effort in 
this field has long been maintained by such bodies as the Department of Defence, 
the Air Force, and other armed forces.35
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All this would not be so problematic if news outlets that were credulous 
and uncritical due to cost minimising pressures were balanced by other news 
outlets that are duly sceptical and that invest resources in independent research 
and scrutiny. We cannot hope to design a media institution that guarantees all 
and only the truth relevant to each important story. The best we can do is to 
design a system in which the poor performance of some news outlets is not too 
detrimental to the level of information available to the public, thanks to the 
better performance of competing news outlets. Informed by the diversity of 
voices, citizens can then make up their own minds as to what is best supported 
by evidence. This public good is undercut if a small number of voices domi-
nates the relevant media and thus drowns out smaller voices. As a systematic 
consideration, it is desirable that the diversity of voices be relatively equal in 
power and reach in important respects, so that a more powerful competitor 
cannot drown out its rivals.
However, the mass media system in the US is highly concentrated. This is 
an important part of the explanation for the media’s poor performance. Even 
if critical voices exist that consistently expose relevant evidence that is mostly 
ignored by most media, the critical voices may not reach the majority of the 
public. The bulk of the mass media in the US is owned by about half a dozen gi-
ant conglomerates—Time Warner, Disney, Viacom, News Corporation, General 
Electric and Bertelsmann.36 There are other large media corporations that round 
out the dominant companies but that do not match the overall dominance of the 
big six. There are also some companies with particular dominance in a given 
medium, such as Clear Channel in radio, or Gannett in newspapers.
The power of the major media outlets lies not only in the fact that they are 
the direct source of news for a massive proportion of the public, but also in the 
fact that they set the agenda for many minor media outlets. Small news outlets 
that are not owned by the large media conglomerates must minimise costs like 
their competitors. They too try to cut spending on reporters and on investigative 
resources. As a result, much of their international and national news and analysis 
is taken from the major outlets. This is one way in which, the major outlets are 
agenda-setters. What they choose to discuss, the facts they present in the discussion 
and the tenor of their coverage set the agenda for smaller outlets who do not have 
the resources to independently investigate stories while remaining competitive 
against the major companies.
propaganda or pSyopS
A related problem that bears distinct mention is that of government propaganda. 
The over-reliance on government sources and a failure to seek out critiques of 
these or to fact-check them is made even more problematic when the government 
sources engage in what is (euphemistically) called psychological operations or 
PSYOPS. In an article on 19th Feb 2002, the New York Times reported that the 
Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Influence was “developing plans to provide news 
items, possibly even false ones, to foreign media organizations,” the goal being 
to “influence public sentiment and policy makers in both friendly and unfriendly 
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countries.”37 Amidst public outrage, the Pentagon closed the office, but Defence 
Secretary Rumsfeld quietly admitted that all of its tasks would simply be carried 
out by other agencies.
A relatively recent development in government news releases is the use 
of video and audio news releases (VNRs and ANRs). These are produced to 
resemble news segments on television and radio. These have long been in use 
by corporations to smuggle favourable coverage of their product (i.e., advertise-
ment), into news broadcasts. The segment is intended to pass as news because it 
informs viewers of some technological or pharmaceutical innovation. While the 
PR firms producing these releases generally take care not to make false claims, 
they have an imperative to avoid dissenting views, downplay criticism, include 
paid testimonials and exaggerate effectiveness as much as possible short of a lie. 
US government departments, including the Defense Dept also use such releases. 
The releases often include reporting by former television news reporters and 
are in all other ways indistinguishable from news clips. Given the cost cutting 
imperatives of the media companies, they have an incentive to cut down on 
their staff of reporters or on their budget for independent news gathering, and 
to resort to such news releases as far as possible. Significant US government use 
of VNRs and ANRs has occurred at least under the Clinton and the most recent 
Bush administrations.38
Often the government produced releases are distributed to international news 
organizations like Reuters and AP, from where they reach major US networks, and 
then feed through to local affiliates.39 While the government claims that it informs 
the recipient organisations about the producer of the segment, this information 
may get lost as it travels the chain from international news organizations, to lo-
cal ones. Even if the information reaches the broadcasting agent, in the absence 
of a legal requirement to the contrary, the agent has an interest in neglecting to 
mention the source, to cast its news show in a favourable light by promoting the 
impression that the show’s own reporters created it.
The congressional Government Accountability Office has released at least three 
reports stating that the use of such releases in news may constitute “covert propa-
ganda” on the part of the government, despite government pronouncements that 
the fault lay not with them but with the news broadcasters who failed to disclose 
the origin of the video and audio segments. The GAO has no enforcement abilities 
and the government has, for the most part, taken no note of the reports.40
Another recent revelation about Defense Dept propaganda relates to retired 
military officials.41 Retired military officials are widely used by news stations as 
independent military experts (not tied to either the government or to defense 
companies) not merely on strategic decisions of troop movements, but also on 
broader policy for the US war in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The assistant Secretary of Defense for public affairs in President George W. 
Bush’s first term, argued that in a spin-saturated news climate, opinion is swayed 
most by voices perceived as authoritative and independent. Retired military 
analysts were identified as such voices. Since news shows were increasingly us-
ing these analysts, they were targeted as particularly influential. The idea was to 
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treat these analysts as ‘message force multipliers’ or ‘surrogates’ (to use Defense 
Dept terms) who could be counted on to deliver the administration’s themes and 
messages to the public in the form of their own opinions.
The analysts were not paid to echo the government view. However, the ana-
lysts collectively represent about 150 military contractors either as lobbyists, 
senior executives, board members or consultants. Such military contractors 
derive an advantage from inside information about the military’s needs that 
is unavailable to their competitors. Analysts are of greater use to the military 
contractors if they can boast inside access. The Defense Dept offered just such 
insider access. The analysts received hundreds of private briefings from senior 
military leaders, officials from the White House, State Department and Justice 
Department. They were taken on tours of Iraq and given access to classified 
intelligence. Moreover, the Defense Dept maintained a close watch over the 
interviews and opinion pieces delivered by these analysts. Those who were 
critical of the administration’s policy were not invited back, thus losing their 
valuable inside access.
SeCtion Seven: ConClUSion
The military and economic might of the US places at the disposal of its govern-
ment powerful instruments of foreign intervention. These have been repeatedly 
used in the form of military intervention and covert action and have often re-
sulted in grave injustice. The global justice literature must surely examine this 
issue. Yet, it is inadequate to examine it simply in terms of inter-national and 
supra-national institutions. This is because the global economic role of the US as 
well as its military might make it highly unlikely that significant international 
sanctions would be implemented against it. Accordingly, it is fruitful to discuss 
US domestic institutions that create a systematic pressure towards military and 
covert action; that make such action easier; and that remove such action from the 
ambit of public vetting.
It is difficult to allay the fear that such military and covert action will con-
tinue, and unjustly so. The growing power of the relevant lobbies in the US, 
the increasing international competition for control over key scarce resources 
and the gradual cultivation by emerging world powers of their own spheres 
of influence suggest that military and covert action will retain its attraction 
for the relevant interests. The failure of the major US news media to make any 
significant and systematic changes to address their credulity during the Bush 
administration suggest that informed public debate over war policy is no more 
likely than has been the case. The growing use of private military and intelli-
gence contractors allows for added secrecy and has the potential to make covert 
action more tempting.
Given the likelihood that such unjust action will continue, it is an imperative 
task for political philosophers to examine the institutions described in this paper 
and to assess possible reforms that would reduce the likelihood of military and 
covert intervention by the US.
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